The last decade has seen an increasing application of game theoretic tools in the analysis of electricity markets and the strategic behavior of market players. This paper focuses on the model examined by Fabra et al. (2008) , where the market is described by a two-stage game with the firms choosing their capacity in the first stage and then competing in prices in the second stage. By allowing the firms to endogenously determine their capacity, through the capacity investment stage of the game, they can greatly affect competition in the subsequent pricing stage. Extending this model to the demand uncertainty case gives a very good candidate for modeling the strategic aspect of the investment decisions in an electricity market. After investigating the required assumptions for applying the model in electricity markets, we present some numerical examples of the model on the resulting equilibrium capacities, prices and profits of the firms. We then proceed with two results on the minimum value of price caps and the minimum required revenue from capacity mechanisms in order to induce adequate investments.
I. INTRODUCTION
HE development of electricity markets all around the world has been accompanied by the announcement of a significant number of investments by market participants, either aiming to strengthen their position in the market or reflecting their desire to enter the market. In reality though, only a small percentage of these projects was actually completed or is under construction, while the majority of the announced investments will likely be cancelled. A clear and widely accepted explanation of this phenomenon doesn't exist.
Moreover, the investments in generation capacity are long term investments characterized by high fixed costs associated with significant risks. Generation units, and especially midmerit and peaking plants, can recover these costs during hours of high prices. Therefore, as prices result from the intersection of the supply and demand curves, producers have strong incentives to influence the supply curve by making it steeper.
The strategic behavior of market participants has been examined extensively in the literature through the use of game theoretic tools. Still, the focus of most efforts was in the strategic bidding of the participants in the spot market. A comparatively unexplored area in the literature is related to the strategic investments in electricity markets, affecting directly and in a more consistent way the supply curve in the spot market than, for example, economic or physical withholding.
In this paper we examine how a variation of the gametheoretic model presented in [5] can be practically applied to electricity markets. More specifically, in Section II we briefly review the literature on modeling strategic behavior in electricity markets. In Section III we give the theoretical background of the model. In Section IV we discuss the model and how it can be applied in the context of electricity markets, giving at the same time some numerical results. Finally, in Section V we provide two applications with regulatory interest, on the minimum values for price caps and capacity mechanism revenues required to attract sufficient investments.
II. LITERATURE SURVEY

A. General
The prediction and analysis of the strategic behavior of electricity market participants has been modeled using various approaches. A survey can be found in [1] , where it is shown that there are three main lines of modeling trends: optimization, equilibrium and simulation models. Our focus in this paper falls in the equilibrium modeling of the market, both in the short term (corresponding to the second stage of our model), concerning spot market competition, as well as in the medium to long term (first stage of our model), representing investment decisions in imperfect electricity markets.
B. Spot Market Competition
The main models used in the electricity market literature are based on the competition models of Cournot, Stackelberg and Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE). On the contrary, the capacity constrained price competition models 1 , often used in economic literature, have not received much attention.
The difference in the above models is the strategic variable of the players: in the Cournot and Stackelberg models firms compete in quantities, in the SFE in supply curves, and in the capacity constrained price competition model they compete in prices. The solution of all these games is based on the concept of Nash equilibrium.
Most models in the literature apply the Cournot competition model, mainly due to its simplicity and ease in extending it. The main criticism against it is related to the use of quantities as strategic variables, when in reality firms submit supply curves in the form of stepwise increasing price-quantity functions. This is the main advantage of the SFE approach, 1 In the capacity constrained price competition models we include both the Bertrand-Edgeworth type models, typically corresponding to a discriminatory auction, as well as the multi-unit auction models, where bids are offer prices corresponding to given capacities.
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C. Strategic Investment Models
There are two strands of literature e investment in an imperfect electricity m examines the dynamic aspect of investmen modeling (see for example [8] - [12] ). The how a sequence of capacity investments under uncertain and evolving market dem decisions of the firms are modeled using e the Stackelberg competition framework.
The second strand of literature, related t involves game-theoretic models that s behavior of firms under a two-stage fram [13] - [17] ). The first stage of the model investment stage, where firms decide on ho build, while on the second stage firms c market. The two-stage game is solved by in order to find its subgame perfect equilib examine a specific investment period (or c under a static environment, with the strategic behavior from exogenous parame investigate it. Therefore, there seem to studies on regulatory issues, as in [5] on m The work in [14] - [17] assumes Cournot second stage, while [5] , [6] and [13] assum under capacity constraints. All models assume uncertain demand with a c distribution, while demand is inelastic (i.e. and [6] . Asymmetric firms (i.e. firms with and/or capacity costs) are considered onl Finally, no model assumes firms having in
The model presented in this paper is a va [5] , involving a discrete demand func marginal production cost. As we are mainl this model can be applied to electricity m [5] , [18] and [19] for the theoretical backgr
III. THE THEORETICAL MO
A. General Description
In this section we present a general fram someone can model an electricity who medium term horizon. The two-stage m useful in investigating the strategic charact ed by complexity and in the advantages and be found in [1] and ison of the SFE and 2]. etition model provides urnot and SFE ones, it auction model, first ss application than the ng number of papers y in the context of the elow ([4]- [7] ). e examining strategic market. One strand ents using simulation hese models examine ts decisions are made demand. The strategic g either the Cournot or d to the present paper, study the strategic ramework ([5]- [6] and el corresponds to the how much capacity to s compete in the spot by backward induction ilibrium. These models r cycle) of the market e scope to "isolate" meters and thus better to be well suited for market rules. not competition in the ume price competition els, apart from [14] , continuous demand i.e. vertical) only in [5] ith different marginal only in [14] and [17] . initial capacities. variation of the one in nction and non-zero inly investigating how y markets, we rely on kground of the model. ODEL amework under which holesale market in a e model presented is acter of the investment rice offer is assumed to be in [4] that the outcome of dmissible steps in the offer decisions of firms in an electr affect aggregate investment number of simplified assumpt make the model tractable, but easily extended in numerous the peculiarities of electricity More specifically, the electr stage game under uncertainty their investments in generatio stage firms compete in pri During the investment stage future demand, which is re stage. We want to find the su game, thus the game is solved solve the pricing stage and th we proceed to the solution of of the game is illustrated in Fi Their decisions are irreversi results, we assume that the technology, with capacity cos generally lumpy character of t Demand Realization. We ass and can be approximated by Hence, demand can take two value , with probability , with probability 1 . Both firms have the same be function. The value of demand players between the investme to the demand realization, we decisions of each firm become Pricing Stage. During the simultaneously prices and com Bids are subject to a price cap , thus always allowing not o cost but also of the capital marginal cost . We assum from the lowest priced firm utilized they continue buying are paid based on their offe pricing 4 ). Note that the comp involves only the newly in capacity for the firms is consid In the following we will duopoly. It will be solved by will first present the solution 3 This is a common assumption in 4 Alternatively one could assume without significantly changing the re of the two designs and how they affec 2 ctricity market and how these may ents and spot market prices. A ptions have been made in order to but the presented framework can be us ways in order to account for all ty markets. ctricity market is modeled as a two nty. In the first stage firms choose ation capacity, while in the second prices under capacity constraints. ge there is uncertainty about the resolved right before the pricing subgame perfect equilibria of the ed by backward induction: we first then, taking this solution as given, of the investment stage. The timing Fig.1 .
timing of the game. investment stage, firms choose t of capacity they want to build. rsible. In order to have tractable the two firms choose the same cost 0. We do not consider the f these investments. assume demand is price-inelastic 3 , y a binomial distribution function. wo values, either the low demand 0, or the high demand value
. We assume that 0 . beliefs for the demand distribution and is realized and revealed to both ment and the pricing stage. Parallel we also assume that the investment me common knowledge. the pricing stage, firms choose compete under capacity constraints. cap , for which it holds t only the recovery of the marginal al cost. Both firms have the same sume that the consumers first buy m and only if its capacity is fully ng from the next firm, while firms ffers (i.e. we assume discriminate mpetition held at the pricing stage installed capacity, as no initial sidered. ill examine the model under a by backwards induction, thus we ion of the pricing stage, based on in electricity market literature (see [5] , [6] ). e uniform pricing, like in [3]- [7] and [13] , results of the capacity stage. A comparison ffect investments can be found in [5] . Lemma 2 of [18] and Proposition 1 of [19] , and then the solution of the capacity stage, based on Proposition 3 of [19] .
B. Pricing Stage
In the pricing stage the two firms have capacities ,
where with we refer to the capacity of the small firm and with to the capacity of the large firm. Then the solution of the pricing stage is given by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1
Suppose that the demand is . Then there is a unique equilibrium which satisfies the following: Proof The proof for (i) and (iii) is immediate, as (i) corresponds to the classical Bertrand competition result, while in (iii) capacity does not suffice so the price goes to the price cap. For the proof of (ii) the reader is directed to [18] , as it is a slight generalization of Lemma 2.
C. Capacity Stage with Demand Uncertainty
Under demand uncertainty five regions need to be examined. Note that it will always hold ≤ for the large firm, as it cannot sell more quantity than the maximum demanded and will avoid having excess capacity as it is costly.
1.
In each of those regions the expected profits of the two firms will be a linear combination of the profits derived in Proposition 1 for the corresponding demand value, weighted by its respective probability of realization. For example, assume we are in region 2. Then if the demand is equal to = the profits of the firms correspond to the ones of region (ii), while for = they correspond to region (i). All the profit functions corresponding to the above five regions can be found in the Appendix. The equilibrium capacities 5 then are characterized by the following proposition, based on Proposition 3 part (ii) in [19] 6 . Proposition 2 Suppose that the demand can take either the value , with probability > 0, or the value , with probability 1 − . Moreover let ̃= = >$?= . Then in any subgame perfect pure-strategy equilibrium, aggregate capacity is if ∈ !1 − , 1" and if ∈ !0,1 − ". For = 1 − ̃ any aggregate capacity in the interval , ,can be sustained as an equilibrium.
Proof We refer the interested reader to [19] . Proof See the Appendix.
In general the capacity stage is characterized by a multiplicity of equilibria which are proven to be very dependent on the parameter values, as it is can be seen in [19] . In order to present some numerical results of the model, we will characterize capacity equilibria under a specific set of parameter values 7 , as defined in Lemma 1. 
IV. MODELING THE ELECTRICITY MARKET
A. Applying the Model to Electricity Markets
The proposed two-stage framework conceptually matches the decision stages of the wholesale electricity markets and the long run character of the investment decisions prior to the realization of uncertain demand. Moreover it accurately depicts the strategic complementarities of capacity decisions during the investment stage, which in turn are a crucial parameter in the results of the subsequent competition stage.
The major drawback of the model, when compared to electricity markets, is the assumption of a single pricing stage period. Although this is the usual approach in the literature (for example in [5] , [6] ), in reality firms compete repeatedly during the life of their investment under a continuously evolving game, similar to the one examined in [8] . As the scope of the paper is to give some intuitive results that could be used as a benchmark, modeling in more detail the aforementioned stochastic game is left for another instance. Thus the pricing stage will be assumed to correspond to a representative trading period for the realized demand state. Still one can see that as long as all parameters 8 of the game stay constant, the pricing stage will always give the same equilibrium 9 . This can be "exploited" in order to make the application of the model more realistic. A second aspect of the model that must be discussed is the interpretation of the demand and its distribution. Based on the formulation of the model, the demand in the pricing stage is covered only by the newly installed ge Provided that the range of the derived equi not large and considering the generally demand and the retirement of older un assumption of the model can be ignored. can either refer to the average expected high or low 11 ), or it can correspond to a hi state on the yearly load duration curve. I probability would refer to the relativ periods. Since firms maximize expecte demand states, both interpretations are demand distribution, although a two poi seem simplistic, in many cases the d authorities (ministries / regulators / TS high/low or high/medium/low demand s least for the scope of this paper, it is consid As far as the predictions of the model resulting continuum of equilibria is anoth model, as it is not clear which of them wil little predictive value in the model and req of an equilibrium selection method. multiplicity of equilibria doesn't preven some useful results from the model, presen
Finally, the presented model does not ta initial capacities of firms and a possible c technologies. All these constitute possibl model, which will add some complexity lead to the reduction of the number of equi
B. Conventions and Parameter Specificat
In order to proceed to the application of need to make some conventions and furthe I. The capacity stage refers to an annu investments have been completed. refers to one representative trading During this period all parameter value II. There are N pricing stages, correspon of hours the generation plant is ex model examines only one representat III. The capacity cost c corresponds investment cost of the plant, spread e pricing stages 12 . Then we will apply the model for two t merit CCGT operating 6000 hours and operating 200 hours. The hypothetical a costs for the two technologies are 100,000 CCGT and 50,000 €/MW-year for the variable costs are 60 €/MWh and 100 €/MW For the demand we will investigate two the two possible interpretations of demand 10 Because only new capacity participates in the p could be considered as the contestable demand for ne 11 In order to be exact, the states should be named model implies that a third low demand state exis periods where the market is not contestable by the ex would be the case for example when nuclear unit usually having contracted the total of their capacity at 12 Since all pricing stages yield the same equilibriu 13 The assumptions on the parameter values illustrative purposes and have not been the result of a generation capacity 10 (A1) There are two equally demand, and , with interpretation of the demand a (A2) The expected load dur first by defining the hours the be operating and then by sp higher demand hours will be Then we set the value of the higher hourly demand inte similar way for the other inte will equal 2 3 8 , while at the calculations lead to = 1.
calculation for the case of the both demand scenarios we ass 
C. Numerical Results of the M
We now proceed to a num based on the above comments the CCGT plant, assuming th order to be able to satisfy the c In Table I one can see the e firms, calculated for different probability p in order to assess TA EQUILIBRIU It is interesting to note that are symmetric, facing the sam have asymmetric capacities. T firm will choose to be the sma to be the large firm. Why wou being small it will have a grea large firm (see Corollary 1). small range of equilibrium respective values are even com 14 The case = 0.67 and = 150 it will be omitted. ally probable ( = 0.5) values for = 1.2 . This is closer to the d as the average yearly demand. uration curve is split in three parts, the expected technology is going to splitting this interval so that the be twice the lower demand hours. equal to the average demand of interval, while is calculated in a terval. Following this procedure, p e same time we assume that the .5 . As an example, the above he CCGT is illustrated in Fig. 2 . In assume = 5,000 MWh.
n curve approach for CCGT e Model umerical application of the model, nts. We investigate only the case of that = 1.2 = 6,000 MWh, in e conditions of Lemma 1. e equilibrium capacities of the two nt values of the price cap r and the ess the robustness of our results. hat although the two firms initially ame costs, in equilibrium they will s. Therefore it is expected that one mall firm and one firm will choose ould a firm prefer to be small? By reater return on investment than the 1). Note also, in this example, the m capacities and how low the compared to the low demand value. 150 €/MWh doesn't fall under Lemma 1 so ng equilibria can be found in [19] .
pacities of the large firm 14 
€/MWh 600 €/MWh
Now in the pricing stage we will examin demand cases. In the high demand case w + = , with both firms offering price cap. Assuming = 150 €/MWh, the belong to the intervals presented in Table I The low demand case is not as strai pricing stage equilibrium is in mixed str again = 150 €/MWh. For illustration pu restrict ourselves just to the equilibrium present the results of this case for vario Then, from Proposition 1, we can calculat prices as shown in Table III . Note that the depicts the equilibrium price supports, w pair of capacities constitutes an equilibri stage. Another interesting result, which can b that the price distribution of the large dominates the one of the small firm. Th likely for the price of the small firm to be of the large firm. Therefore the small fir sell at capacity. It is also interesting to note that the prof when in region (ii) of Proposition 1, are in of the capacity of the large firm. Looking a this could be interpreted as if the large fi serve the residual demand, after the small capacity. On the contrary the total profits o always a specific percentage of the large to min , ⁄ .
ine separately the two e we will always have g their energy at the the firms' profits will II. be seen in Fig. 3 , is ge firm stochastically his means it is more be lower than the one firm is more likely to
rofits of the large firm, independent (directly) g at its profit function, firm always chose to all firm has sold all its ts of the small firm are e firms' profits, equal 
V. APP
A. Defining the Minimum Pr
The most common measur especially in systems with ti the use of price caps either o on the electricity spot price. shown to effectively reduc manipulate market prices, the on the investment decisions overlooked. This effect has papers (see for example [20] a caps may deter investments, e not appropriately chosen.
One can see from Proposit caps significantly affect the p thus their profits for each ex turn directly affects the resul stage, which can have seriou supply of the electricity marke inadequate investments on be the market may run into the ri The strategic model we pre define a benchmark for what price cap. More specifically P will invest enough to cover th 1 ̃= 1 [21] ), all stressing how price s, especially of peaking capacity, if sition 1 that, in our model, price e pricing strategies of the firms and expected level of demand. This in sulting equilibrium of the capacity ous implications on the security of rket: a "low" price cap may lead to behalf of the participants and thus risk of power curtailments. presented can give an easy way to hat may be considered as a "low" y Proposition 2 states that the firms r the high demand scenario only if ch is equivalent to
nequality, in order for the market to gate capacity equilibrium, the price high as the marginal cost of the s its capital cost divided by the of the high demand. Moreover it price cap is not dependant on the and, but only on their probabilities, he right hand side are exogenous. the parameter values described in the results presented in Table V . Thus a relatively small price cap is sufficient for the CCGT's, while a much larger price cap is required for the OCGT's. More generally, if p takes values in the interval P E Q . C Q R then the corresponding minimum price cap intervals for the CCGT and OCGT are ,82.22 ,126.66and ,350 ,1100respectively. The big difference between the range of values of the two price caps implies that the best policy, under the examined pay-as-bid framework, would be to implement different price caps on the offers of each generation unit technology, instead of a uniform market price cap 15 .
B. Capacity Mechanisms
Assume now that apart from a price-cap, a capacity mechanism is also available in order to solve the "missing money" problem of the more expensive units like OCGT. Practically, the main purpose of the capacity mechanism is to "push" the market to the high capacity equilibrium by reducing the investment cost of the firms. Then, if the firms receive an annual income of T , it must hold 16 T > − ! − "!1 − "U. Applying the formula to various levels of price caps, for the case of the OCGT, we get the results presented in Table VI . The above exercise doesn't necessarily have to be applied with r equal to the price cap. Instead one can use an even lower value which statistically the market rarely exceeds, depicting the empirical observation that prices rarely reach the price cap (see [21] ).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the application of a game-theoretic model, described in [5] , meant to capture the strategic element of the investment decisions in electricity markets. The two stages of the model closely resemble the firm decision process, when determining their level of investments.
Due to the stylized nature of the model, in order to apply it to real-world data, a series of assumptions and conventions need to be made. These involve mainly the period the model is examining, assumed here to be annual, and the representation of the demand uncertainty. As this paper is a first effort in investigating the applicability of the model in a realistic context, we have followed a static approach, closer to the spirit of the theoretical model. Alternatively, one could apply the model in a dynamic context, more accurately describing the stochastic demand and the spot market competition, or extend it, to account for initial capacities or asymmetric costs.
Despite the simplicity of the applied model, it manages to give some straightforward results, especially important in a regulatory context. For example in Greece, where both a price 15 It is interesting to note that if there were two technologies , V with < W and a regulator set different price caps on offers, so that < < W , then the market could be treated as two separate markets, where the demand of the "high marginal cost market" would correspond to the demand exceeding the aggregate capacity of technology i. 16 The cost c here refers to the annual cost. cap and a capacity mechanism are in place, the relevant values have been set to r=150 €/MWh and T = 35,000€/MW-year. Although three new CCGT plants are expected to come online in the next year, no OCGT plant is planned to be constructed, despite the official call for such investments. The model offers an explanation for this, as well as how it can be resolved, by the proper re-evaluation of the above values.
